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Effects of the IoT on Network Security
Zachary Virgo
Introduction
• The Internet of Things (IoT) is a group of network connected devices 
used for anything from controlling lights in a room to cooking and 
cleaning
• IoT devices are made by a large variety of manufacturers with a 
variety of uses and interfaces
• There is no set of laws of regulation in the Unites States setting
guidelines for how to create these devices, including their security
How Big of an Impact Does the IoT Have?
• Estimated to have 75 billion connected units by 2025
• Can be found in homes across the world, but also factories, power 
plants, in the military and government facilities. 
• Not just smart speakers and vacuums, but automated machines that
put together cars, measuring devices, and drones.
• Collect personal data on users and on tasks they do.
• Data is at risk due to lack of security. 
Purpose
• To show how suspectable to attack various IoT devices are in real 
world conditions without expensive, specialized equipment
• Analyze current legislation for IoT security and see if it is effective in 
helping manufacturers prevent attacks 
Method
• Device types were chosen based on how popular they are
• Attacks were based on what a reasonable person could do without 
expensive specialized equipment and limited knowledge
• Attacks were researched and chosen based on past success
• 12 Volunteers were found with various IoT devices in their homes and 
these attacks were carried out with permission
• House 0 is a control, a home with no IoT devices, House 11 has at 
least one of each type but all devices have had firmware and patches 
updated to the latest version. 
Device Types
• Amazon Alexa
• Google Home
• Smart Bulbs
• Smart Cars
• Smart Watches/Fitness Trackers
• Video Doorbell/Security Systems
• Baby Monitor
• Automated Vacuum
• Smart Locks
Amazon Alexa Methods
• Voice Squatting – An app (Skill) is created that leave the recording 
function open after the Skill is turned on. This is done by having the 
device attempt to say unpronounceable words (in this case H0R7!!). 
The Skill often has a name that sounds like a word often spoken, like 
Liight or Viirus, so it could be activated randomly through casual 
conversation near the device. Once run, it prompts the user to say 
their Amazon password, and records it. 
• Yelling Through a Window- If an attacker can see a device through an 
open window, they can make it respond to commands. If the user has 
audio ordering turned on, and has not activated two factor
authentication on the device, items can be purchased without the 
user’s approval. 
Amazon Alexa Data
• Skill was denied publishing from Amazon, but in testing inside 
volunteer homes did work. 
• This was a widely reported vulnerability, that it appears Amazon has 
gotten better at detecting. 
• Speaking to the device through an open windows does work, but if 
the built in two factor authentication has been enabled, it would 
require confirmation on the Amazon app. 
Google Home Method
• Voice Squatting – Works similarly to the Alexa, except it is an Action instead 
of a Skill, and uses Python for coding. 
• This one has an option to leave recording option for a certain amount of
time built into the code, leaving it open for 100 seconds allows for 
recording of ambient discussion, and you can prompt the user for a 
password. 
• Was never approved or disapproved of by Google, possible quality control 
or possibly just backlogged.
• Window Yelling – This method did work, but unless it has been set up 
previously voice enabled shopping isn’t an option on the Home. Setting it 
up involves enabling two-factor authentication. Contact and Calendar 
information is accessable.
Smart Bulb Methods
• Large variety of products each that bring their own issues and 
vulnerabilities
• LIFX bulbs, found in store at many US retailers save network 
passwords in plaintext on the board inside the bulb, have to break the 
bulb to get to it. 
• Many bulb systems can hook up to a hub, the most popular version of 
this is the ZigBee hub, which comes in various styles and is even built 
into some Amazon Echo devices. The processing stack can be 
exploited by software found online called ZigDiggity and around $40 
of parts with a Raspberry Pi 3 B+ 
Smart Bulb Data
• LIFX bulbs were replaced, broken open and hooked up to a break board and files 
were transferred to Kali Linux, where the passwords were found in the file in 
plaintext as ASCII, which was then encoded to cleartext with an ASCII translator
• Two homes had non ZigBee smart hubs with bulbs hooked up to them and the 
bulbs could not be identified via radio transmission. 
• Houses 2, 6, and 9 had bulbs with official ZigBee hubs that came packaged with 
bulbs, bulbs were identified via radio transmission and taken control of, allowing 
for full access to bulb control through console commands. A payload could them
be added to the data stream and if the owner disconnected and reconnected the 
bulb with the payload, it could spread something malicious across the network.
• Houses 8 and 11 had Amazon Echo devices with ZigBee hubs built in, these could 
not be accessed in the same way. This could mean Amazon has increased security 
on these devices, or simply that the Echo devices auto update and others do not.
Smart Car Systems
• Vary in complexity depending on brand and model of vehicle. 
• Can be hacked by accessing the Controller Area Network bus in all cars 
built since 1996, examining the traffic between the CAN and the car’s 
onboard computer, and then making false packets to send to make the 
cardo what you like. 
• Requires very specific equipment with a high cost, and time to study each 
manufacture's specific system. Also, attempting this voids the warranty on 
the vehicle, so trying was decided against
• Vehicles with app control like FordPass which allows for locking and 
unlocking of the vehicle can be taken over with only a few minutes of 
physical access to the vehicle, but without a cloned FOB key, you can’t go 
more then a few feet away from the vehicle’s location. 
Smart Watches/Fitness Trackers Method
• Many models can simply be stolen, if unlocked, thief will have access 
to data the device is connected to. 
• Smart watch devices of models owned by volunteers (Apple Watch, 
Fit Bit Versa 2, Fossil Sport Watch) were tested with this method.
• A popular technique for phones, an evil twin attack was set up using a 
fake WiFi network set up using software on Kali Linix.
Smart Watches/Fitness Trackers Data
• Many newer devices have a feature that auto locks when removed from 
the wrist, a 4 digit pin must be entered to unlock, with limited attempts 
before the device had to be unlocked via an app on your phone or tablet. 
This prevents brute force attacks. This also prevent the “Steal” method 
from working on all the but the Fossil Sport, but the device only had access 
to apps such as Calendar and email. 
• Some devices allow for this feature to be turned off, but it is required to 
have kind of payment app on the device (Google Pay, Apple Pay, ect.)
• Evil Twin attacks were found to be useable, as a fake, no password required 
network was set up for volunteers to connect to via their smart watches, 
none of them detected a problem with the network. Traffic was able to be 
monitored on this network. 
Video Doorbells/Security Systems Method
• IP camera systems have one large weakness: weak passwords. While 
this plagues many IoT devices, these are often security system or 
monitoring inside homes. 
• Using ID’s and Passwords gathered through other attack methods for 
devices, or default IDs and passwords, were attempted for logging 
into the system for these devices.
• Researchers also tried to shut the devices off temporarily using a
DDoS attack after a scan to see camera IPs. 
Video Doorbells/Security Systems Data
• Four of the houses, 2, 4, 7 and 9, were using either the default 
password for the devices or were using the same password they used 
for their network log in with the network name as the username. 
• This gave complete access to the cameras, including being able to 
save recorded video. 
• DDoS attacks disabled the cameras for roughly 4-5 minutes, which is 
the time it took them to boot up after being taken offline. If someone 
were trying to break in, this could give them a window.
Baby Monitor Method
• Similar to IP cameras and with similar vulnerabilities. 
• Somewhat famous for lack of security features when pointed at 
sleeping babies. 
• Default/Reused usernames and DDoS attacks were used
• Devices were also searched for on the popular open web search site 
Shodan which finds unsecured devices open to the internet. 
Baby Monitor Data
• House 7 used the same user name and password as it did for its other 
IP camera system and its network. 
• House 10 had left the system default username and password in 
place. 
• Both devices were suspectable to DDoS attack and took nearly 10 
minutes to reboot. 
• House 10’s device was findable on Shodan, and with the default
username and password, was accessable.
Automated Vacuum
• Most brands have vulnerabilities only accessible via physical access 
• Some, typically cheaper, brands have remote vulnerabilities through 
techniques such as manipulating the MAC address of the device, or 
unsecured encryption. 
• All volunteer homes with vacuums had iRobot Roomba devices, 
which, due to bad press, has increased security on recent models. 
While the device takes maps of your home and has a camera, current 
models have AES 256-bit encryption. At this time there are no known 
remote vulnerabilities for use with this brand of device. 
Smart Locks Method
• Varied by brand, and type of lock
• Locks often have bad physical builds, even if the technology is sound
• Bluetooth Sniffing with a Raspberry Pi 4 and reelyActive software 
allows for packet collection over Bluetooth which can be analyzed in 
WireShark to potentially find password data before it is encoded. 
Smart Locks Data
• 5 houses had locks of various types, 6 had a door lock deadbolt, and 
5, 8, 10, 11 had padlocks. 
• Only locks on house 6 and 11 were not able to be accessed via
Bluetooth sniffing. 5, 8, and 10 had unencrypted information 
transferring between devices which included password data for the 
network. 
• Of note, locks on houses 6 and 11 were purchased within the last 
year.
• Luggage locks, no matter how expensive, always have a master key for
TSA agents at airports to be able to unlock. These have been leaked 
and can easily be 3D printed.  
Pwnagotchi Attack Method
• A machine learning, WPA key stealing device built out a Raspberry Pi 
W and some opensource software. 
• Given enough time on a detectable network, it reads the traffic
between devices in order to try and find the hashed WPA network
key, and save that to a file which can be run through a program such 
as Hashcat to be deciphered into cleartext. 
• The idea is that more devices on the network talking constantly (as 
IoT devise are wont to do) will make the amount of time this attack 
takes shorter while giving it more accuracy due to low security 
standards on IoT devices. 
Pwnagotchi
Attack Data 
House Number Amount of Time (in Minutes)
H0 147
H1 122
H2 125
H3 118
H4 116
H5 116
H6 112
H7 111
H8 96
H9 90
H10 82
H11 100
147
122 125
118 116 116
112 111
96
90
82
100
H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H11
Pwnagotchi Processing
Time (Minutes)
House Number Correct WPA2 Cracked
H0 Yes
H1 Yes
H2 Yes
H3 Yes
H4 Yes
H5 No
H6 Yes
H7 Yes
H8 Yes
H9 No
H10 Yes
H11 No
Pwnagotchi Attack Data Cnt.
• As the data shows, for most of the homes, the more devices on the 
network, the faster the device cracked the key, with the exception of 
House 11, which had the most devices, but also the most up to date 
devices and security. 
• All networks had their WPA key cracked except 5, 9, and 11.
IoT Legislation
• No Federal legislation exists to govern the IoT or its security in the 
United States at current time.
• The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
released a set of guidelines for companies to follow, but it is not 
mandatory. 
• Legislation was suggested in March 2019 for devices and companies
sold to the US Federal Government which would put the NIST in 
charge of legislation for IoT devices, but it has not been voted on, this
would not cover consumers.
IoT Legislation Cont.
• California and Oregon have passed laws in 2019 that set restrictions 
on IoT security and how collected data is handled. 
• Unfortunately California’s uses broad wording like requiring 
“reasonable security feature or features” or “Security appropriate to 
the nature of the function of the device.”
• Oregon’s law has more straightforward stating “a requirement that a 
user generate a new means of authentication before gaining access to 
the connected device for the first time.”
Conclusions 
• Security for IoT devices is as diverse as the devices themselves
• Some are very secure, others are almost completely open to the 
intent out of the box
• If manufacturers won’t come together, legislation needs to be passed 
to require certain features be includes, or even automatically turned 
on, with these devices. 
• This includes two-factor authentication, implementing strong 
usernames and passwords and proper encryption of data.
Considerations for Future Research
• The real world environment is chaotic with many variable like modem 
and router choices, age, and built in security. Results should be tested 
in a lab under controlled conditions for authenticity. 
• This study tried to find easy to use methods that it doesn’t take much 
time or money to be able to do, but further study in more intrusive 
but specialized methods should be done. 
• Legislation from other countries should be compared to what is 
proposed in the USA to see if either can be improved.
